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III.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-801(8)(d) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2.
IV.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is a Petition for Review of decision by an Administrative Law Judge
on March 18, 2004 and Order Denying Motion for Review issued September 8, 2004 by
the Labor Commission. The Applicant was injured within the course and scope of his
employment with the Department of Public Safety on three occasions, December 17,
1990, June 10, 1994 and May 14, 1998. Applicant requests benefits pursuant to the Utah
Workers Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35A-1-1 et. seq. The Labor Commission
awarded benefits, the amount of which are not determined, but denied permanent total
disability benefits claiming that pain was not related to any of the industrial accidents.
The Labor Commission improperly determined that the pain was the significant cause of
the Applicant's disability.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether Mr. Braegger is Permanently and Totally disabled. This issue is a
question of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision
under a correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d).
2. Whether the Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the Industrial Accident. This
issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Appeals will not disturb
the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by the
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"preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes the
duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission,
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267
(UtahCt.App. 1993).
3. Whether the impairment determined by Dr. Chung on the Chronic Pain Syndrome
is appropriate by law. This is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court of
Appeals will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are
supported by the "preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals
also recognizes the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation,
to determine whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent
evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. The Court of Appeals
will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by
the "prepond' ranee of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes
the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission,
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267
(UtahCt.App. 1993).
4. Whether the Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the industrial accident.

This

issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Appeals will not disturb
the findings or order of the Commission if they are supported by the
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"preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals also recognizes the
duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation, to determine
whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in favor
of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v. Industrial Commission,
389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267
(UtahCt.App. 1993).
5. Whether the Labor Commission is mandated to send this matter to a medical
panel. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision under a
correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b- 16(4)(d). . See Nicholson
v. Industrial Commission, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial
Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
6. Whether "pain" should be considered a significant cause of permanent total
disability benefits. This issue is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of
Appeals will not disturb the findings or order of the Commission if they are
supported by ^he "preponderance of evidence". However, the Court of Appeals
also recognizes the duty, particularly with reference to a denial of compensation,
to determine whether the Commission had arbitrarily disregarded competent
evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictory evidence. See Nicholson v.
Industrial Commission, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 1964), Ashcroft v. Industrial
Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
7. Whether the Labor Commission should be mandated to issue an award. This is an
issue of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision
under a correction of law standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d).
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8. Whether Odd Lot is still appropriate. This is an issue of law. The Court of
Appeals reviews the Labor Commission's decision under a correction of law
standard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d).

VI.
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Review of the Utah Labor Commission determination of
benefits and whether the Utah Labor Commission followed it's own rules, directives and
statutes in making it's decision. Appellant John Brent Braegger seeks this matter be
remanded back for further determination and issuance of an award and to have the matter
referred to a medical panel pursuant to Utah Labor Commission rules.
VII.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
John Brent Braegger filed three applications for hearing on April 24, 2002 for
injuries suffered on December, 17, 1990 (Case no. 2002948), June 10, 1994 (Case No.
2002497) and May 14, 1998 (Case no. 2002948). A hearing was held on August 28,
2003. Judge Deidre Marlowe issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on March
18, 2004. A Motion for Review was timely filed with the Labor Commission. On
September 8, 2004, the Commissioner for the Utah Labor Commission, R. Lee Ellertson,
denied the Motion for Review. A Petition for Review was timely filed on September 27,
2004.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. John Brent Braegger worked for the Utah Department of Public Safety, Criminal
Investigations Bureau as a Police Officer.
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2. As a Police Officer, he was injured 3 significant times while in the course and
scope of his employment. These include:
a. December 18, 1990, he was moving a file cabinet to retrieve an item, he
felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He continued to experience pain,
numbness and tingling in his left leg going down the front and side of his
leg. While he did improve, the numbness and tingling never v/ent
completely away. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 2.
b. June 10, 1994, while moving offices from one floor to another, he felt
sharp pain again in his low back, with increased numbness and tingling to
his left leg. The low back pain increased. See Findings of Fact, paragraph
3.
c. May 14, 1998, Mr. Braegger was descending a complete flight of stairs at
the Public Safety Building. He overstepped the first step and fell head
over heels down 13 metal, carpeted stairs. He struck his left cheek, low
back, upper neck, left shoulder and left hip. The pain intensified
dramatically in his low back. He felt sharp pain described as a "sharp
shock" into his left arm and fingers. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 4.
d. Immediately after the 1998 injury, Mr. Braegger experienced pain, loss of
strength and stamina to walk. He experienced difficulty getting in and out
of chairs and vehicles; going up and down stairs became very difficult;
and he would grind his teeth because of the intense pain. He continued to
have pain and weakness in the neck, shoulder and low back areas radiating
into his arms and legs. See Findings of Fact, paragraph 6.
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e. Mr. Braegger continued to work in pain until March 15, 2001 when it was
determined he could no longer perform his essential duties as a Police
Officer.
f.

Mr. Braegger has suffered no additional injuries since the 1998 accident.

g. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah has admitted that all accidents were
within the course and scope of employment.
h. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah further admits to medical causation
of the significant injuries relating to the neck, shoulder, cheek, low back
and hip. See pages 7, 8, 11, 12 and 52 of hearing transcript (contained in
the addendum)
i. Mr. Braegger has a pre-existing type II diabetes condition (non insulin
dependent). However, his diabetes did not prevent him from working, nor
does it now.
j.

While Mr. Braegger did have pain from the other industrial injuries, it was
not as significant as the pain and weakness immediately following the
5/14/1998 accident,

k. All the parties agree that Mr. Braegger is functionally unable to work.
1. All of the parties agree that while Applicant did suffer from pain and
weakness prior to May 14, 1998 solely as a result of the prior industrial
accidents, it intensified considerably and immediately following the May
14, 1998 event.

9

3. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah denies, however, the medical relationship
between the pain relating to the Applicant's peripheral neuropathy and the
industrial accidents.

IX.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Braegger is permanently and totally disabled from the industrial accidents he
suffered while in the course and scope of his employment. He suffered injuries, pain and
weakness which is undisputed. The Workers Compensation Fund admits the industrial
accidents, but disputes whether the pain is related to any of the industrial accidents and
that it is the pain that is the sole disabling condition. Mr. Braegger maintains that the
pain is part and process of the Industrial Accidents. Nevertheless, even if the Chronic
Pain Syndrome is not related to the Industrial Accident, the Applicant would still be
considered Permanently and Totally disabled. The Labor Commission should have
referred this matter to a medical panel as there are significant medical issues and pursuant
to their own rules, a nedical panel referral is mandated. Finally, the Labor Commission
failed to issue and determine an award for benefits on Mr. Braegger's industrial accidents
leaving the determination up to the Respondents to "figure it out".
X.
ARGUMENT
Mr. Braegger is Permanently and Totally Disabled.
It has been stipulated that Mr. Braegger was injured within the course and scope of
his employment with the Department of Public Safety on three occasions. Further, there
has been no evidence presented that Mr. Braegger was injured prior or subsequent to the
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industrial accidents. Mr. Braegger has been unable to work since March 15, 2001 since it
was determined by his employer that he could not return and perform his previous work
activities. Mr. Braegger has been determined disabled according to the Social Security
Sequential Decision making process. Immediately following the industrial injuries, Mr.
Braegger suffered pain and weakness. While some of the pain relating to the neck,
shoulder, low back, cheek, and hip is directly related to the industrial accident, there is a
dispute about whether his chronic pain syndrome is related. The law is clear that an
aggravation or "lighted up" of the chronic pain "give rise to" and leads to the direct cause
of the disability. Giesbrecht v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 544 (1992), Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 14, 25 (Utah 1986). Judge Marlowe determined that the chronic
pain were more debilitating than the injury to the neck, shoulder, cheek, low back hip and
related pain. Nevertheless, the question is not which is more debilitating, but rather could
the Applicant return to previous work as a result of the industrial injuries. See Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-413)l)(b)(iii). This was never analyzed, and according to the
functional capacity report, (see attached) and Department of Public Safety, Mr. Braegger
would not be able to return because of his industrial injuries.
The Chronic Pain Syndrome is related to the Industrial Accident
The Applicant did not have any substantial pain or weakness prior to the
industrial accidents and more specifically, the accident of 5/14/1998. Immediately
following the accident, Applicant suffered pain and weakness. There was no intervening
event that would cause the pain. All of the physicians note the proximity of the
5/14/1998 event and the location of the pain relative to the injuries suffered by the
Applicant. Nevertheless, the peripheral neuropathy was puzzling.
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The Applicant was treated by Dr. Stansfield for pain and weakness in the low
back area as well as the neck. On September 7, 1999, Dr. Stansfield conducted
Electromyographic testing to ascertain the cause of the pain. Specifically, Dr. Stansfield
stated: 'The purpose of the EMG at this time is to determine if there is evidence of a
peripheral neuropathy secondary to the diabetes or entrapment neuropathy secondary to
the fall that he experienced". Dr. Stansfield is an expert in diabetes. While Dr. Stansfield
does not reveal his findings are related to the industrial accident, his report clearly
indicates the peripheral neuropathy was not related to diabetes. Therefore, it is deduced
to be related to the industrial accident as they were the only options determined by Dr.
Stansfield.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah sent the Applicant to Dr. Jeffrey Chung on
April 18, 2000. Dr. Chung is a physiatrist. A physiatrist is someone that deals in sports
related injuries. Dr. Chung revealed that while Mr. Braegger was compliant with his
therapy, the medical treatment for the industrial accident would increase the symptoms of
pain and discomfort. See page 038 ME. Dr. Chung also related that Dr. Felix felt the
pain in the Applicant's left hand were caused by a rotator cuff tear which would be part
of the industrial accident. See page 038 ME. Mr. Braegger indicated he had pain in his
neck, hips and upper extremity. Applicant manifested to Dr. Chung that he had the
following symptoms (see page 39 ME):
a.

Constant pain since 5/15/1998

b.

Difficulty driving because of severe sharp pain.

c.

Turning neck to the left caused pain to the right side.

d.

Shooting pain in his neck on left side.
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e.

Headaches

f.

Low back Pain

g.

Pain in left hip

h.

Swelling of legs

i.

Feet and legs would sweat

j.

Leg cramps in back of calves and arch of feet

k.

Difficulty sleeping
Dr. Chung finds medical causation between the chronic pain syndrome and the

5/14/1998 accident. Dr. Chung determined on April 18, 2000 that Applicant had
sustained an injury on 5/14/1998. He opined that Applicant's injuries "helped the
patient's non-industrially related rheumatologic condition to become clinically
significant." See page 047 ME. He further opined that the 5/14/1998 accident "has
caused the patient to have chronic soft tissue injuries in the cervical and lumbosacral
region. In addition, subsequent to the industrial injury of 5-14-98, Dr. Chung opined that
the patient's previously clinically asymptomatic rheumatologic condition with features
consistent with polymyositis became clinically evident." Dr. Chung opined "The patient
in my opinion was teetering on the edge of a cliff without actually falling and it was
likely that eventually the patient would have fallen anyway. Suffering from his industrial
injury of 5-14-98 did not help his condition at all and possibly or even probably caused
him to be pushed off the cliff, causing his previously clinically asymptomatic systemic
rheumatologic condition to become symptomatic." (See page 049 ME). Dr. Chung
continued to treat the Applicant indicating he had "Status post industrial injury of 5-1498 when the patient fell down stairs causing chronic symptoms in the cervico-thoracic
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region and at the left hip region in addition to other findings consistent with a systemic
connective tissue disorder with polymyositis-type features". See 026, 027, 030, 032 ME.
On October 17, 2002, Applicant was sent again to Dr. Chung for determination of
impairment. See page 009 ME. During that examination, Dr. Chung reversed his
position by saying the Applicant did not have polymyositis or myositis. Dr. Chung
further indicated that "If my assumptions of fact are incorrect, my conclusions based on
these assumptions are also likely to be incorrect". He then indicated one of two
possibilities on medical causation. His first theory is that Mr. Braegger's medical
problem is "currently unknown to medical science". His next theory is that Mr.
Braegger's pain is related to psychological problems such as conversion disorder and/or
malingering. Dr. Chung dismissed the psychological problem immediately. Dr. Chung
further indicated that the industrial injuries "precipitated or accelerated multiple
symptoms related to multilevel degenerative changes at the cervical and lumbar spine.
Dr. Chung then confuses the issues when he determined that applicant has diabetes
related, four-extremity peripheral polyneuropathy and bilateral peroneal
mononeuropathies. Note that he did not take into consideration that the industrial
accident (legal causation) contributed to or aggravated an underlying asymptomatic preexisting condition. He was solely looking at the underlying cause.
Dr. Stromquist opined several diagnoses relating to the pain condition:
A. He has advanced degenerative disc disease in the cervical and lumbar spines
(industrially related).
B. He has a rotator cuff tear in the left shoulder (likewise industrially related).
C. He has pain and restricted mobility in the left hip (likewise industrially related).
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D. Dr. Stromquist finally determined and suggested that "The causation of chronic pain
syndromes specifically is unknown, but it is held to relate to physical trauma in a
susceptible individual, aggravated by certain adverse conditions, among which may
be depression or psychological maladjustment, physical deconditioning and an
adverse treatment environment (litigation or insurance claims are a factor). Dr.
Stromquist indicated that the Degenerative Disc Disease was aggravated by the
injury as was his left hip arthritis. His left lateral femoral cutaneous severe
syndrome was caused or aggravated either by the fall, or by wearing the heavy
equipment around the hips such as a gun or tool belt.
Dr. Chris Chung, a Fellow with Jim Macintyre opined that Applicant had Neck
pain, probable C-Spine and T-spine mechanical dysfunction. (See page 151 ME)
All of the physicians note the proximity of the complaints in relation to the
industrial accident of 5/14/1998.
Utah law recognizes the aggravation rule such that where an industrial injury
aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a pre-existing condition, the entire resulting
injury is compensable so long as the claimant can "show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition." Giesbrecht v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 544(1992), Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986).
The pain and weakness that Applicant receives should be considered related to the
industrial accident. The symptoms surfaced immediately after the industrial accident of
5/14/1998. It is in the location of his neck, shoulder, low back, cheek, hip and radiating
toward his extremities. Since there is time, place, location of injury and absence of any
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evidence to the contrary, it therefore should be considered as part of the industrial
accident. If there is an underlying asymptomatic condition that becomes symptomatic as
a result of the industrial injury, it is likewise compensable under the workers
compensation system. Finally, "but for" the industrial accident, he would not be
suffering these problems. He was not being treated for chronic pain, nor did he anticipate
any treatment for the condition. Finally, even though he has continued pain in his neck,
shoulder, low back and hip, which is directly and causally related to the industrial
accident, it should not be assumed that all of his pain and weakness is related to other
causes. In fact, the chronic pain syndrome that is in dispute is related only to his
extremities. Judge Marlowe wholly misinterprets the records when she states there is
"nothing in the medical records which relates this syndrome to the injury". As indicated
above, there is ample evidence to show a connection with the pain and the industrial
accident.
The impairment determined by Dr. Chung on the Chronic Pain Syndrome was not
appropriate.
The Utah Labor Commission requires that an impairment must be determined
according to the Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides as published by the Utah Labor
Commission. If the condition is not found in the Utah 2002 Impairment Guides, then one
is to utilize the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition and as
modified by the Utah Labor Commission guidelines. See Rule R612-7-3.
The Utah's 2002 Impairment Guides do not address pain. However, in the AMA
Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition on page 566, it states: (See
addendum)
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Pain is subjective. Its presence cannot be readily validated or objectively
measured. Physicians are confronted with ambiguity as they attempt to assess the
severity and significance of chronic pain in their patients. In large part, this stems
from the fundamental divide between a person who suffers from pain and an
observer who attempts to understand that suffering. Observers tend to view pain
complaints with suspicion and disbelief, akin to complaints of dizziness, fatigue
and malaise. As Scarry remarked, "To have great pain is to have certainty, to hear
that another person has pain is to have doubt". (See page 566)
. . . . In the majority of cases there is no demonstrable tissue pathology.
Thus, pain can exist without tissue damage, and tissue damage can exist without
pain. In summary, there is no "pain thermometer," that is, no biological measure
that correlates highly with individuals' complaints of pain. (See page 566.)
. . . Because percentages for pain-related impairment have not been used
and tested on a widespread basis, as have other impairment ratings used in the
Guides , it was decided that impairment ratings for pain disorders would not be
expressed as percentages of whole person impairment. (See page 566.)
The AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 5th Edition
specifically addresses when there are "controversial Pain Syndromes. It specifically
states:
As noted above, physicians disagree sharply about whether individuals
with chronic pain should be construed as having conditions with definite, albeit
obscure, biologic underpinnings. The alternative is to describe these people as
having CPS (Chronic Pain Syndrome), psychogenic pain syndromes, or some
other term implying that their pain cannot be associated with a well-accepted
biologic abnormality. For purposes of this chapter, the pain of individuals with
ambiguous or controversial pain syndromes is considered unratable. (See page
371)
Dr. Chung went contrary to the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment 5th Edition when he determined Mr. Braegger suffered an impairment rating
for pain of 25%. Dr. Chung then further complicates matters by advocating for the
Workers Compensation Fund that the pain impairment exceeds that of all other functional
limitations without any basis. Dr. Chung admits in his report that the impairment rating
is not accurate. In fact, it is misleading. The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
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Impairment rarely allow an impairment relating to pain as it is often associated with
various injuries or diseases. See page 570. "Physicians recognize the local and instant
pain that commonly accompanies many disorders. Impairment ratings in the Guides
already have accounted for pain." Dr. Chung's report should not be accepted by the
Labor Commission as it clearly goes against it's rules of using the AMA Guides and
secondly, Judge Marlowe should have sent the matter to a medical panel for clarification
and determination of impairment according to rule.
Judge Marlowe misapplies the direct cause of the permanent disability. She states
that it is related to the Chronic Pain Syndrome. She infers that because the impairment
rating for pain as indicated by Dr. Chung is higher than the injuries to the neck, low back,
shoulder, cheek and left hip that the functional limitations are not the "direct cause".
There is a significant difference between impairment and disability. Impairment is a loss
of function, while disability is how the injuries affect one in their vocation. Further, the
statute for Permanent Total Disability requires a "substantial" not a "sole direct cause"
standard. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413.
Judge Marlowe ruled completely opposite to uncontroverted evidence
Judge Marlowe further cites in her record that Mr. Braegger claims that without
the pain, he would still be able to work. This goes contrary and is completely opposite to
the evidence presented:
Hearing Transcript, page 55, line 18 to page 56, line 7
Q. Okay, do you believe that your current symptoms are related to the accident
that was in May of 1998 and, if so, why?
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A. I believe that they are, yes. The reason I believe that is I've had no problems
or any type like symptoms prior to the accident. All my problems have started to come
on and caused and notice since the accident. Prior to that, I was functioning fine, doing
my job, going on just like normal. Other than I'd watch my lower back, I knew I had a
problem there, so I was cautious about that. But I didn't have any problems with neck,
shouoder, supper back, my legs, the pain, none of that until the accident in 1998.
Hearing Transcript, page 57, lines 4-8.
Q. Okay. If you did not have these neck and shoulder and low back problems, in
your opinion, do you believe that you could still function as a - as an officer?
A. Yes.
Hearing Transcript, page 65, line 22 to page 66, line 18. by Attorney Lorri Lima.
Q. My question goes to the amount of pain you felt. You characterized your pain
in '98 as being something that was -that the kind of pain that you had never felt before.
My question is: Did you feel that kind of pain related to your lower back pain in '90 --.
A. Yes.
Q. and'94?
A. Yes. But in 1998, there was more on my body that was injured. In 1990 and
'94, all I had was my lower back. It hurt immensely when I injured it. It got my
attention. I went to the doctor.
In 1998,1 re-injured my lower back and my neck and my shoulder and my
hip from falling down the stairs. And I had immense pain through that area. And it
continually go worse.
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Q. So is it correct to say that it was a combination of all of the body parts that
were in pain, that you felt such pain?
A. Oh, I knew that I had - yes, that's correct.
The matter should have been sent to a medical panel
Judge Marlowe relies heavily on Dr. Chung's reports1. Nevertheless, the report is
quite ambiguous and does not assist the trier in fact to determine all of the medical issues,
including causation of the pain. Dr. Chung initially indicates direct medical causation
with the industrial accident. He then reverses his opinion. He does not, however, recant
his position concerning the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. In essence, he has
confused the facts about whether the pain syndrome is caused, lighted up or aggravated
from the industrial accident. Dr. Chung's opinion goes contrary to the treating
physicians and creates more confusion as to the relationship between the upper extremity
pain and the entire industrial injuries. It should be realized that the treating physicians
maintain that the Applicant has, in fact, a form of myositis who still maintain the pain is
indisputably and directly caused by the industrial accident of 5/14/1998. Dr. Chung's
report clearly goes contrary to the AMA Guides for Evaluation of Permaneni Impairment.
The Labor Commission has issued Guidelines when a Medical Panel must
be convened. In Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 904 P.2d 671 (1995), the Supreme
Court mandated the use of a Medical Panel even though the rule indicates "Guidelines".

1

Dr. Jeffrey Chung is well known in the workers compensation arena. He is a physiatrist that is often hired
by Workers Compensation Fund to perform insurance medical examinations. In this case, Judge Marlowe
cites 7 of the 9 medical causation findings of fact and attributes them to Dr. Chung and only cites to only
one Finding of Fact by one treating physician for the Applicant.
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R602-2-2, Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case
to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge
where one or more significant medical issues may be involved.
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there
are:
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the
injury or disease;
2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person,
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff
date which vary more than 90 days;
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent
total disability, and/or
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than
$10,000.

A Medical Panel is mandated in this situation as there are conflicting medical
opinions relating to medical causation, conflicting medical reports indicating impairment
of over 5%, conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability
and conflicting opinions concerning medical expenses amounting to more than $10,000.
By rule and mandate of the Supreme Court, the matter must be referred to a medical
panel.
Because of the unknown properties of the "cause" of the chronic pain syndrome,
it should be considered as part of the industrial accident.

21

In Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund & Industrial Commission. 889 P.2d
409, 411 (Utah 1994) this court stated: 'To give effect to that purpose, the Act should be
liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of
compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." State Tax Commission
v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). The purpose of the workers
compensation statute is to alleviate the financial hardship on individual employees and
those dependent upon them by spreading the cost of an injury throughout the industry that
employs the workers. Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 364 P.2d
1020 (1961), Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885, (1945). To further
the purpose of the act, any doubt concerning the right of compensation must be resolved
in favor of the injured worker and his dependents. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796
P.2d 676 (1990), J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 61 P.2d 949 (1983),
Kaiser Steel Corp v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (1981), McPhie v. Industrial Commission,
567 P.2d 153 (1977). The Labor Commission has failed to even consider resolving any
doubt of compensation in favor of Mr. Braegger.
Odd Lot is still appropriate
The odd lot doctrine "allows the Commission to find permanent total disability when
a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined
with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain employment." Zimmerman v.
Industrial Commission, 785 P.2d 1127 (1989). In this case, it is agreed that the Applicant
cannot perform the essential duties required in his occupation. It is further agreed that he
cannot be rehabilitated. Further, the parties agree that there is no steady work that the
Applicant can perform.
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Odd Lot doctrine is quite similar to the Permanent Total Statute in that one looks at
the combination of all impairments to determine whether the Applicant can return and
whether the industrial accidents contribute to the inability to work. This is stipulated to
and proven at hearing.
In Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684 (1997), the Court of Appeals stated that the
Labor Commission "did not take into consideration the extent to which his physical
impairment, compounded by other factors, could render him totally disabled". In this
case, Judge Marlowe improperly looked at the chronic pain syndrome and not all of the
factors. Further, in Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (1984), the
Commission denied an employee permanent total disability benefits solely on the
percentage of impairment and the fact that the employee was eligible to retire. The
Marshall Court determined that reliance on the impairment rating was improper as was
done in this case.
Judge Marlowe did not issue an award.
The Labor Commission and Administrative Law Judge have certain duties and
responsibilities to make appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award.
See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10. In Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App.
1991) the Court of Appeals requires an Agency "must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review".
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731, P.2d 1079 (1986), the inadequacy
of an administrative law judge's findings justified remanding the matter back to the
hearing level for resolution of conflicting testimony, findings and determination. In
review of the pleadings, Judge Marlowe only issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law. While on page 8, she does indicate an Order, the order does not indicate the amount
of the permanent partial impairment, nor when interest would begin to accumulate.
Further there is no determination of when Mr. Braegger reached maximum medical
improvement. Further, because there is no dollar amount ordered, there is no
determination of attorney fees that would be deducted. Finally, Judge Marlowe does not
indicate which medical expenses were reasonably related to the industrial accident and
what medical visits were appropriate for determination of the travel allowance. In
essence, the Labor Commission stated, "Defendants, you figure it all out".
XL
CONCLUSION

This matter should be remanded back to the Labor Commission for referral to a
medical panel. Further, the chronic pain syndrome should be related to the industrial
accident either by cause, aggravation or being "lighted up" as a result of the industrial
injury. Therefore, it should be compensable. Finally, the Order is not specific in
determining benefits and should be remanded for clarification.
DATED this 21 st day of March, 2005.

^

^

v.:. z^JfilJ (A
David W. Parker
Attorney for John Brent Braegger
Applicant/Appellant/Petitioner

24

Case No: 20040825

Certificate of Hand Delivery
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copy of foregoing document
was hand delivered upon the following parties on this
^1 day of March, 2005.
Alan Hennebold, Esq.
Labor Commission of Utah
Attorney For: Employers Reinsurance Fund
Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O.Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Phone:(801)530-6800
Fax: (801) 530-6804
Floyd W. Holm
Attorney For: Utah Dept. of Public Safety
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 57926
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0926
Phone:(801)288-8059
Fax:(801)288-8164

^

/

//

"

/

V?

XII.
ADDENDUMS

25

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

JOHN B. BRAEGGER,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

Case Nos. 2002496, 2002497,2002498

STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUND, EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

Judge: DEIDRE MARLOWE

Respondents.

Hearing:
August 28, 2003
Appearances:
John B. Braegger, Petitioner, - David W. Parker, Attorney at Law
Public Safety & WCF, Respondents - Floyd Holm, Attorney at Law
ERF, Respondent - Lorrie Lima, Attorney at Law
On April 24, 2002 Mr. Braegger filed three applications for hearing with three different
injury dates: December 17, 1990 (Case No. 2002496); June 10, 1994 (Case No. 2002497); and
May 14, 1998 (Case No. 2002948). All applications claim medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, permanent total
compensation, travel expenses, interest, and reimbursement to the Petitioner's private health
insurance company.
The Respondents agree that the Petitioner is unable to maintain substantial, gainful
employment. The Respondents do not dispute the occurrence of the industrial injuries, but do
dispute whether they are contributing, significant causes of the Petitioner's current condition, and
therefore the other benefits are disputed as well.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

John B. Braegger worked for the Utah Department of Public Safety, Criminal
Investigations Bureau as a police officer during all industrial events relevant to this claim.

2.

On December 18,1990 Petitioner was moving a file cabinet to retrieve an item he had
dropped behind it when he felt a sharp pain in his lower back. He experienced pain,
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numbness and tingling in his left leg, going down the front and side of his leg to his knee.
He went to see Michael Smithers D.C. six or seven times for treatment. ME p. 160.
Petitioner estimates that he got about 80% better, but the numbness and tingling never
went away completely.
3.

On June 10, 1994 the department was moving offices from one floor to another. The
Petitioner was moving a file cabinet and felt sharp pain again in his low back, and
increased numbness and tingling in his left leg. His low back pain was increased too.

4.

For both of these injuries the doctors did not place Petitioner under any restrictions, but
gave him exercises to do to strengthen the low back. This made him more "functional"
but he still had pain. The Petitioner did not miss any days at work.

5.

Petitioner treated with Dr. Marble until November 15, 1994, at which time Dr. Marble
indicated that there was nothing more to be done. ME p. 170. Petitioner didn't receive
any treatment after that for his low back until the 1998 accident.

6.

On May 14, 1998 the Petitioner was starting to go down the stairs and overstepped the
first stair and fell head over heels down a flight of about 13 metal, carpeted stairs. He hit
his left cheek, low back, upper neck, left shoulder and left hip. The pain increased
dramatically in his low back - there had always been some from the 1994 injury that had
never gone away. He felt sharp pain, described as a "sharp shock" going down into his
left arm and fingers.

7.

Shortly after the 1998 injury, the Petitioner began experiencing diffuse pain, loss of
strength, and stamina to walk. He experienced difficulty getting in and out of chairs and
vehicles, and going up and down stairs became very difficult. He started to use the
elevator to get to his floor at work because of pain and weakness. He did not have these
symptoms prior to the 1998 injury.

8.

The Petitioner also began to have sweating at nights and great pain, waking up every two
hours or so. He clenched his teeth because of the pain and broke off his front teeth at the
gums during one night. Clenching and bruxing continued to be a problem and Petitioner
had to wear a night guard to protect the remaining dental work. Petitioner needs to have
the bridge replaced and implants done to replace the missing teeth.

9.

Petitioner continued working after the May 1998 injury until March 15, 2001, when he
failed a fitness for duty test due to his chronic pain condition and weakness. The
Petitioner believes that he would have continued working had the only health conditions
been his spinal and shoulder conditions rather than the chronic pain sydrome and related
symptomology.

10.

Since 1998 Petitioner has had no other traumatic injuries.
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11.

Dr. Don L. Stromquist evaluated the Petitioner on September 17, 2002 and concludes that
the Petitioner suffers from a chronic pain syndrome, which is not polymyositis. Dr.
Stromquist also recognizes the spinal injuries and a rotator cuff tear. Dr. Stromquist also
indicates that the Petitioner has permanent functional restrictions that effectively make
him incapable of employment. ME p. 55.

12.

Dr. Stromquist indicates that the structural disease of Petitioner's spine is most likely less
than 50% of his overall impairment. The "greater part of [Petitioner's] impairment,
something over 50%/' is created by his chronic pain syndrome." ME p. 55.

13.

Dr. Jeff B. Chung began treating the Petitioner and first opined that the chronic pain and
weakness was due to a rheumatologic condition which was accelerated by the 1998
injury. ME p. 47. But on October 17, 2002 Dr. Chung indicates that his five opinions of
4/18/00 through 8/8/02 were based on an assumption that the Petitioner did in fact have
polymyositis. Since that diagnosis turned out to be incorrect and was a critical
component of his previous reports, Dr. Chung indicates that those reports are flawed and
should not be considered to be an accurate representation of the Petitioner's current
medical state. ME p. 9.

14.

Dr. Chung indicates that there is no question that Petitioner has a rotator cuff tear and
severe degenerative processes in both cervical and lumbar regions, which he attributes to
the three accident dates at issue. ME p. 15. Dr. Chung recommends surgery to correct
the rotator cuff repair. ME p. 20.

15.

Dr. Chung indicates that it cannot be determined that there is a medical causal link
between the chronic pain symptomology, which includes weakness, night sweats, leg
cramps, swelling, and tingling in arms and hands, and the industrial accident of May 14,
1998, even though these symptoms occurred after the accident. ME p. 11. These
symptoms are also not related to or caused by the degenerative spinal conditions, which
are industrial related. ME, p. 12, 47.

16.

Dr. Chung gives a 5% per whole person impairment for the cervical injuries, all
attributable to the 1998 injury. He gives a 5% whole person impairment to the lumbar
condition (including the hip condition, ME p. 2), and apportions an equal amount of
causation to each of the three industrial injuries. ME p. 15. He gives a 1% whole person
impairment to the left rotator cuff tear, all attributable to the 1998 injury. ME p. 16. Dr.
Chung also gives the Petitioner a 6% whole person impairment rating for his diabetes and
diabetes-related four extremity peripheral polyneuropathies. ME p. 16.

17.

Dr. Chung opines that 50% of the Petitioner's current condition is related to the structural
pathology of the spine, but that the chronic pain syndrome is the clinical entity that is
most likely causing Petitioner to be disabled. ME p. 16. Dr. Chung indicates that
Petitioner is unable to work because of the chronic pain condition, and not the spinal and
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shoulder injuries related to the industrial injury, and that vocational retraining would
likely not be of significant benefit. ME p. 17. Dr. Chung allows Petitioner to be at MMI
three to four weeks after April 18, 2000, whether he shows any progression or not. ME p.
48.
18.

The Petitioner was found to be disabled for purposes of Social Security disability on
March 15, 2001.

19.

The Parties stipulated that the proper compensation rate for the Petitioner would be the
maximum rate in any year of injury.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Medical Causation

Petitioner must show that any conditions for which he claims benefits are medically
causally related to the industrial injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah
1986). The burden of proof is on the Petitioner.
The Petitioner argues that the question is not whether there is a label or diagnosis on the
chronic pain condition, but whether the condition relates to the 1998 injury. I agree. Petitioner
further argues that because onset of the chronic pain syndrome was right after the 1998 injury, it
is causally related. However, there is nothing in the medical records which relates this syndrome
to the injury, and it is simply not enough to show that the onset was subsequent to the accident in
the absence of any medical link. Therefore, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence to show
by a preponderance that the chronic pain syndrome, related symptomology, and subsequent
dental injuries, were caused by the 1998 injury, and thus the Petitioner is not entitled to workers'
compensation benefits regarding these conditions.
Dr. Chung indicates that there is no question that Petitioner has a rotator cuff tear and
severe degenerative processes in both cervical and lumbar regions, which he attributes to the
three accident dates at issue. ME p. 15. There are no opposing medical opinions and it appears
that Dr. Chung's indications as to medical causation on the cervical, lumbar, and shoulder
regions is based on a reasoned medical opinion. Therefore I conclude that the Petitioner has
shown that he is entitled to benefits with regard to these medical conditions.
2.

Medical Expenses and Recommended Medical Care

Under U.C.A. § 34A-2-401 and 2-418 an employee may recover medical expenses for
medical care which is necessary and reasonably related to injuries occurring in the course and
scope of his or her employment.
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The Petitioner may recover expenses and medical care related to his cervical, lumbar, and
shoulder regions, including the proposed rotator cuff repair. Though not opposed, it is not clear
from the record whether rotator cuff surgery is currently recommended. Dr. Chung did
recommend it at one time. ME p. 20. If it is still currently recommended, Petitioner is entitled to
expenses for that surgery.
3.

Temporary Total Compensation

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-410 reads:
(l)(a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the disability is total, the employee shall
receive 66 2/3 of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury . . . .
The Petitioner missed no work days with the 1990 and 1994 injuries and thus is not
entitled to temporary total compensation benefits for those dates. There was no evidence
presented of time off work with regard to the injury in 1998, and the Petitioner continued
working until March 15, 2001, from which date permanent total compensation is claimed. Thus
no temporary total compensation is awarded.
4.

Permanent Partial Compensation

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-412 reads:
(1)

An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial
accident aud who files an application for hearing under Section 34A-2-417 may
receive a permanent partial disability award from the commission.

(6)(a) For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not
otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial
disability compensation shali be awarded by the commission based on the medical
evidence.
See also Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-7-3 Method for Rating.
Dr. Chung gives a 5% per whole person impairment for the cervical injuries, all
attributable to the 1998 injury. He gives a 5% whole person impairment to the lumbar condition
(including the hip condition, ME p. 2), and apportions an equal amount of causation to each of
the three industrial injuries. ME p. 15. He gives a 1% whole person impairment to the left
rotator cuff tear, all attributable to the 1998 injury. ME p. 16. These ratings are undisputed and
the Petitioner is entitled to permanent partial compensation for these ratings at the maximum rate
in force in the year of the injury.
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5.
Permanent Total Compensation
The parties agree that the Petitioner is and has been for some time incapable of sustaining
gainful employment due to his current health problems. Because parts of this current condition
are apportioned among the various injury dates, and the law in effect when the injury was
sustained governs the analysis, it appears necessary to look at the ruling statutes for the different
injury years.
For the 1990 and 1994 injuries, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 required an analysis
substantively similar to the Social Security Administration, which is set forth in Utah
Administrative Code Rule 612-1-10, as follows:
2.

For claims arising from accident or disease on or after July 1, 1998 and prior to
May 1, 1995, the Commission is required under Section 34A-2-413, to make a
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administrative under Title 20 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, amended April 1, 1993. The use of the term "substance of
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some latitude on the
Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative to
permanent total disability....

B(3)

. . . The sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of
questions and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short., these are:
a. . Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
b.
Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
c.
Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration requirement
in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed
impairments of 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1,
1993?
d.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant
work?
e.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other
work?

Because neither the 1990 or 1994 injuries, separately or together, prevented the Petitioner
from doing past relevant work or any other work, the Petitioner is not permanently and totally
disabled due to either of them, jointly or separately.
The 1998 injury has to be evaluated under § 34A-2-413 (1995), which reads in relevant
portion as follows:
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(l)(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b)

To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i)
the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii)
the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii)
the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.

(c)

To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i)
the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii)
the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit
the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii)
the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv)
the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
coLsideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.

The Petitioner probably meets the requirements of subparagraph (c), (and therefore
(b)(ii)), as he is not gainfully employed and Drs. Chung and Stromquist indicate he cannot
functionally perform his previous employment or any other employment.
Furthermore, I conclude that Petitioner meets the requirement of (b)(ii) to have significant
impairments or combinations of impairments because his cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries
from the 1998 injury all resulted in permanent impairment ratings of 5%, 1/3 of 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
However, the issue is whether the combination of these industrially-caused significant
impairments "give rise to" and are the "direct cause" of the permanent total disability, as required
by (b)(i) and (b)(iii). Dr. Stromquist indicates that the structural disease of Petitioner's spine is
most likely less than 50% of his overall impairment. The "greater part of [Petitioner's]
impairment, something over 50%," is created by his chronic pain syndrome." ME p. 55. Dr.
Chung opines that 50% of the Petitioner's current condition is related to the structural pathology
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of the spine, but that the chronic pain syndrome is the clinical entity that is most likely causing
Petitioner to be disabled. ME p. 16. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Petitioner continued
working after the May 1998 injury until March 15, 2001, when he failed a fitness for duty test
due to his chronic pain condition and weakness. The Petitioner also testified that he would have
continued working had the only conditions been his spinal and shoulder conditions rather than
the chronic pain symptomology. I therefore conclude that the industrial injuries did not "give
rise to" or provide the "direct cause" of Petitioner's permanent total disability, and the claim for
permanent total compensation will be dismissed.
6.

Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF)
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-703 indicates:

If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole person permanent impairment from any
cause or origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employee's employment during the period of July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1994,
inclusive, and if the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer or
its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of
benefits . . . .
Because I have concluded that the 1990 and 1994 injuries do not result in a permanent
total disability, the ERF has no liability for any award herein.
ORDER
Good cause appearing therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the claims for temporary 1otal
compensation and permanent total compensation are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that claims for medical expenses, recommended medical care,
permanent partial impairment, travel expenses, and reimbursement to Mr. Braegger's private
health insurance for symptoms related to the chronic pain syndrome are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Utah Department of Public Safety, and/or the
Workers' Compensation Fund, pay permanent partial impairment ratings as outlined in Dr.
Chung's report for the cervical, lumbar, and shoulder injuries to John B. Braegger, in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412 at the maximum compensation rate for the year of the injury.
Any unpaid amounts to date are due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent
(8%) per annum, under U.C.A. § 34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorney's fees shall be deducted from the
compensation awarded above to John Braegger, and sent directly to David W. Parker, according
to U.C.A. 34A-1-309 and U.A.C. Rule 602-2-4.
t
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Utah Department of Public Safety, and/or the
Workers' Compensation Fund shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to John
Braegger's industrial injuries, according to U.C.A. § 34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee
schedule of the Utah Labor Commission and further travel allowances under Utah Administrative
Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
Issued this

day of March, 2004

Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed first
class, postage prepaid, on the Jj£_ day of March, 2004 to the following:
John Braegger
867 W. 550 North
West Bountiful, UT 84087
Floyd W. Holm
Workers' Compensation Fund
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
David W. Parker
Attorney at Law
11075 S. State St., Ste. 13
Sandy, UT 84070-5512

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JOHN B. BRAEGGER,

*
*

Applicant,
v.

*
*
*

STATE OF UTAH (DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY), WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case Nos. 02-0496 through
02-0498

*

Defendants.

*

John B. Braegger asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Marlowe's decision regarding Mr. Braegger's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On April 24,2002 Mr. Braegger filed three applications for workers' compensation benefits
with the Commission's Adjudication Division. These applications claimed workers' compensation
benefits from the State of Utah and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to
jointly as "the State" hereafter), for injuries allegedly caused by three separate accidents Mr.
Braegger experienced while working for the State.
Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Braegger's claims on August 28,2003.
On March 18, 2004, Judge Marlowe issued her decision. In summary, Judge Marlowe concluded
Mr. Braegger had suffered work-related cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries and was entitled to
benefits for those injuries. However, Judge Marlowe determined that Mr. Braegger's chronic pain
syndrome was not work-related. Judge Marlowe therefore denied benefits for that condition.
Finally, Judge Marlowe concluded that Mr. Braegger's continuing disability is due to his chronic
pain syndrome, rather than his work-related injuries. For that reason, Judge Marlowe denied Mr.
Braegger's claim for permanent total disability compensation.
Mr. Braegger now seeks Commission review of Judge Marlowe's decision on the grounds
that: 1) his chronic pain is the result of his work accidents; 2) a medical panel should be appointed
to consider his claims; 3) even if his chronic pain is not work-related, his other work-related injuries
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justify an award of permanent total disability compensation; and 4) Judge Marlowe's order lacks
specificity.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact.
In accepting Judge Marlowe's findings, the Commission notes Mr. Braegger's argument that
his accidents at work caused his chronic pain. However, despite Mr. Braegger's lengthy argument as
to why a conclusion of medical causation should be reached, none of the medical experts have
expressed that conclusion. The Commission therefore agrees with Judge Marlowe that Mr. Braegger
has failed to meet his burden of proof on the question of medical causation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The remainder of Mr. Braegger's motion for review deals with the proper application of the
Workers' Compensation Act to the facts of Mr. Braegger's claim.
Mr. Braegger argues that Judge Marlowe should have exercised her discretion under §34A-2601 of the Act to appoint a medical panel to consider the medical aspects of his claim. The
Commission's Rule 602-2-2 sets forth the conditions for appointment of medical panels and
envisions their use when the record contains conflicting medical opinions on significant medical
issues. In other words, medical panels are used to resolve medical conflicts, not create them. In this
case, Mr. Braegger has not established that a conflict of medical opinion exists. It is therefore
unnecessary to appoint a medical panel.
Mr. Braegger also argues that, even if his chronic pain is not work-related, his work-related
cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries are sufficient to qualify him for permanent total disability
compensation. The Commission disagrees. As Judge Marlowe observed, Mr. Braegger stopped
working because of his chronic pain and weakness. Mr. Braegger himself acknowledges that his
cervical, lumbar and shoulder injuries did not prevent him from working. It was his chronic pain and
weakness that took him out of the labor force. The Commission therefore concludes that Mr.
Braegger has failed to meet §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)'s requirement that the work accident was the
"direct cause" of his permanent total disability.1
l Among its several criteria for permanent total disability claims, §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iii)of the Act
requires that "the industrial. . . impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee
from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident... " Without discussing the point, Judge Marlowe
observed that Mr. Braegger "probably meets" the foregoing requirement. The Commission disagrees.
The preponderance of evidence does not establish that Mr. Braegger's work-related impairments
prevent him from performing his pre-accident work activities. Therefore, Mr. Braegger's claim for
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Mr. Braegger contends that the Commission should award permanent total disability
compensation to him under the "Odd Lot Doctrine." While the Odd Lot Doctrine was historically
recognized as a part of Utah's workers' compensation system, in 1995 the Utah Legislature amended
§34A-2-413 of the Act to establish specific criteria for determining whether an injured worker is
permanently and totally disabled. The Commission is now required to evaluate Mr. Braegger's claim
for permanent total disability compensation according to the statutory requirements of §34A-2-413.
Finally, Mr. Braegger contends Judge Marlowe's decision is inadequate because it does not
state the precise dollar amounts Mr. Braegger should receive, or identify the specific medical care
that must be paid by the State. The Commission notes that, although Mr. Braegger complains of a
lack of specificity in Judge Marlowe's order, he has not submitted a computation of the award he
believes is correct.
Judge Marlowe's order correctly states the variables to be used by the parties in computing
Mr. Braegger's benefits. While the calculations are complex, they can be easily accomplished by
insurance carriers. Of course, if Mr. Braegger disagrees with the insurance carrier's computation of
benefits, he can then bring the matter to Judge Marlowe's attention. The same is true for any
disagreement over liability for medical treatment. But at this time there is no dispute and the
Commission sees no need to intervene.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision and denies Mr. Braegger's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
Dated this H

day of September, 2004.

t&A&L&Z'l-^
R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.

permanent total disability compensation must be denied under §34A-2-413(1 )(c)(iii)of the Act as
well as for the reasons stated in Judge Marlowe's decision.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational
disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden
of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent
total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability
to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the
employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the
employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission,
but is not binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited
as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent
minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall
be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the employee's
employment on or before June 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance
carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's
liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks
of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'

teinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
asurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the employee's
mployment on or after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
ombination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through
4A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensation
>ayable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under
lubsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier
y reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312
/eeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established m Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
le employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received
ompensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities
mounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be
educed, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement
enefits received by the employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed
3 by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to
"hapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan
s prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful
mployment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the administrative law judge notice that
le employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise
tipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan submitted
y the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).

(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
ubsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under
ubsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3,
Jtah Occupational Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the
mployer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i)
Trough (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job
lacement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
lsurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the
mployee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The
mployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
dministrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of

permanent total disability.
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability
compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled
employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage
provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from
Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided
under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's
permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently
totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset
provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically
appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake
work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been
offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge finds that the
employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the
record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability
claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has
payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final,
unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent
reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:

(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with appropriate
mployee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as
^asonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for
ermanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total
isability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent
)tal disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that
^asonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability
ompensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for
rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation
jpporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently
)tally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
f Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
3le basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the
[nployee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be
onsidered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and
ondition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable
ttorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect
) reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the
ttorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance
airier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer,
slf-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total
isability compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or
ircumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid
rovision or application.
.enumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
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63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing documents
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required by any applicable statute or rule of the
agency, the presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record
in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order available to aggrieved
parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use the presiding officer's experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session
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and--and, if it's a lay opinion then

not really

relevant.
MR. PARKER:

Your H o n o r , I was

to--my next question w a s , you know:
believe

that?

foundation

it's

And so that w o u l d

going

Why do you

cover

the

aspect.
MR. HOLM:

Well, a foundation

o p i n i o n , but is his opinion as a
r e l e v a n t , Your Honor?

for an

layperson

That's the more

fundamental

que s t i on.
THE C O U R T :
mean,

Well,

I understand

it will just go to the w e i g h t

that.

of what

I

he

says.
BY MR.
Q.

PARKER
B r e n t , you remember

you want me to rephrase
A.

No.

Q.

Repeat

'Okay.

symptoms

the question or do

it?

it, p l e a s e .

Do you b e l i e v e

are related

that your

to the a c c i d e n t

current

that was

in

May of 1998 and, if so, why?
A.
reason

I believe
I believe

that they a r e , y e s .

that is I've

had no problems

any type like symptoms prior to the
All my p r o b l e m s
caused

have started

and noticed

Ti

The

accident.

to come on and

since the a c c i d e n t .

Prior
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that, I was functioning fine, doing my job, going

2

on just like normal.

3

lower back, I knew I had a problem there, so I

4

was cautious about that.

5

problems with neck, shoulder, upper back, my legs,

6

the pain, none of that until the accident in

7

1998 .

8
9

Q.

Okay.

Other than I'd watch my

But I didn't have any

Let me ask it a little bit

different way, okay?

If you did not have the

10

neck or the shoulder or the low back, you know,

11

with the accompanying radiation of pain and so

12

forth going down your hip, would you be able to

13

act as an officer?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

MR. HOLM:

Yes.

Objection.

Same objection,

16

basically, but foundation for an opinion, a

17

medical opinion.

18
19

THE COURT:
that one.

21

MR. PARKER:

Okay.

Let me--let me try

it this way, okay?
Q.

24
25

And I guess this is also a

vocational opinion that's being asked for now too.

22
23

We do need some more foundation.
MR. HOLM:
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And I'm going to sustain

Brent, you--you understood what is
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and you've been a s u p e r v i s o r ;

is

correct?
A.

Y e s , sir.

Q.

Okay.

If you did not have these

neck

and shoulder and low back p r o b l e m s , in your
o p i n i o n , do you believe
function as a--as
A.

an

that you could

still

officer?

Yes.
MR. HOLM:

Objection.

THE COURT:

It's

MR. PARKER:

Same

objection.

overruled.

Okay.

Thank

you, Your

Honor
Your H o n o r , if I may just have

one--one

qui ckTHE W I T N E S S :
answer?

Your

Do you want to hear my

Honor?

THE C O U R T :

Pardon?

THE W I T N E S S :
THE C O U R T :

Did you hear my
Y e s , I did.

MR. PARKER:
record,
Q.
officer
A.

answer?

Oh.

Maybe

just

for

since we were all talking

over

the—

You indicated

the

that you could act as an

if you did not have those —
I said

"Yes, I do."

THE C O U R T :

:Tl

Yes, I understand

that.
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2
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that
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kind
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of p a i n

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

--and '94?

"5

A.

Yes.

body

7

had was my lower b a c k .

8

injured

9

doctor.

that was i n j u r e d .

10

It hurt

your

immensely

It got my a t t e n t i o n .

when I

I went to the

In 1 9 9 8 , I r e - i n j u r e d my lower back and
my neck and my s h o u l d e r

12

down the s t a i r s .

13

that a r e a .

14

Q.

15

combination

16

p a i n , that you felt such

17

A.

and my hip from

falling

And I had immense pain

And it c o n t i n u a l l y
So is it c o r r e c t

got w o r s e .

to say that it was a

of all of the body parts

Oh, I knew

that

through

that were in

pain?
I had--yes,

that's

correct.

19

Q.

Thank y o u .

20

MS.

21

THE C O U R T :
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No further
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questions.

Any r e d i r e c t , M r .

Parker?
MR. PARKER:

23
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to

In 1990 and ' 9 4 , all I

11
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related

But in 1 9 9 8 , there was more on my

6

it.

66

' 90--
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Introduction
This chapter provides information that will enable
physicians to understand pain and develop a method
to distinguish pain that accompanies illnesses and
injuries from pain that has become an autonomous
process, and provide physicians with a qualitative
method for evaluating permanent impairment due to
chronic pain.
This chapter has been completely revised from the
fourth edition. Its new features include (l) an
overview of pain; (2) a discussion of the complexity
of assessing impairment due to pain; (3) a review of
situations in which pain is a major cause of suffering,
dysfunction, or medical intervention rather than a
part of injuries and illnesses of specific organ systems as covered in other chapters of the Guides; (4) a
qualitative method for evaluating impairment due to
chronic pain; and (5) a description of when to use the
methods described in this chapter and how they can
be integrated with the impairment rating methods
used in other chapters of the Guides.

Physicians need to use their clinical judgment as to
what constitutes normal or expected pain in conditions that produce widely variable amounts of pain; a
herniated lumbar disk, for example, may be completely painless or incapacitatingly painful. This
chapter focuses on those situations in which the pain
itself is a major cause of suffering, dysfunction, or
medical intervention. Pain as considered in this chapter is persistent, which is not to say that it is refractory to all treatment, but that it is likely to be
permanent and stationary.

18.1 Principles of
Assessment
Before using the information in this chapter, the
Guides user should become familiar with Chapters 1
and 2 and the Glossary. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the
Guides' purpose, applications, and methods for performing and reporting impairment evaluations. The
Glossary provides definitions of common terms used
by many specialties in impairment evaluation.
It is considerably more difficult to provide a method
for assessing chronic, persistent pain than acute
pain. In chronic pain states, there is often no demonstrable active disease or unhealed injury, and the
autonomic changes that accompany acute pain, even
in the anesthetized individual, are typically absent.
Historically, it was assume I that pain derived from
underlying peripheral tissue pathology and that its
severity should correlate highly with the identified
pathology. Current research, however, shows that
pain perception is less a moment-to-moment analysis of afferent input than a dynamic process influenced by the effects of past experiences. Sensory
stimuli act on neural systems that have been modified by earlier inputs, and the output of these systems is significantly influenced by the ''memory"
of these prior events.

18,2 Overview of Pain
18.2a Definitions
Pain is defined by the International Association for
the Study of Pain' as "an unpleasant sensory and
emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such
damage."

Pain is a plural concept with biological, psychological, and social components. Its perception is influenced by cognitive, behavioral, environmental, and
cultural factors. At first glance, it seems at odds with
scientific medicine because of the difficulty accounting for it with obvious pathophysiologic changes.
Pain is subjective. Its presence cannot be readily validated or objectively measured. Physicians are confronted with ambiguity as they attempt to assess the
severity and significance of chronic pain in their
patients. In large part, this stems from the fundamental divide between a person who suffers from pain
and an observer who attempts to understand that suffering. Observers tend to view pain complaints with
suspicion and disbelief, akin to complaints of dizziness, fatigue, and malaise. As Scarry remarked, "To
have great pain is to have certainty, to hear that
another person has pain is to have doubt."2
The concept of chroni" pain as an extension of acute
nociceptive pain is not valid. Chronic pain is an
evolving process in which injury may produce one
pathogenic mechanism, which in turn produces others, so that the cause(s) of pain change over time.
Support for this concept includes evidence that primary afferent discharge actually has the ability to
injure or kill spinal inhibitory neurons (excitotoxicity), leading to hyperexcitability due to disinhibition.
Peripheral nerve injury can initiate evolving abnormalities in spinal cord neurons, which in turn generate abnormal responsiveness of thalamic neurons,
which in turn generate cortical dysfunction. In time,
these higher-level abnormalities may become independent of the abnormalities that produced them.3
Even in situations that might be expected to provide
clear correlations between perceived pain and identified peripheral pathology, there are perplexing observations. For example, in up to 85% of individuals
who report back pain, no pain-producing pathology
can be identified4; conversely, some 30% of asymptomatic people have significant pathology on magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI)D and computed tomographic (CT) scans* that might be expected to cause
pain. Headache is another common disabling condition in which impairment must be assessed primarily
on the basis of individuals' reports of pain rather than
on tissue pathology or anatomic abnormality. The
reason is straightforward: in the majority of cases
there is no demonstrable tissue pathology. Thus, pain
can exist without tissue damage, and tissue damage
can exist without pain. In summary, there is no "pain
thermometer," that is, no biological measure that correlates highly with individuals' complaints of pain.

18.2b Impact of Pain on Population Health
and Disability
Pain is among the most common reasons for seeking
medical attention accounting for more than 70 million office \isits to ph> sicians each year It is also
the most common cause of disability, with chronic
low back pain alone accounting for more disability
than any other condition resulting m nearly 150 million lost work days in 1988 8 Disability related to
back pain has increased dramatically, although there
is no reason to suspect that back problems by themselves have increased910 Headache disorders are also
a major cause of work loss " Despite advances in
physiologic understanding, surgical interventions,
and pharmacologic therapies, the prevalence of
chronic pam shows no signs of abating and continues
to be of epidemic proportions Notwithstanding this
fact the importance of pam is often discounted
Morris has averred that pam reported by somebody
else falls into the category we reserve for whatever is
invisible, subjective, immaterial and therefore
unreal ' A 1987 report of the Social Secunty
Administration opined that it is impossible to understand the pain that another person is suffering u

18.2c Medical Advances in Understanding
and Managing Pain
Behavioral/Psychological
Several major currents of thought and investigation
in the last three decades have profoundly altered
medical understanding of pam and its associated
behaviors The first was the behavioral hypothesis
that much of the behavior associated with chronic
pain was not intrinsic to a disease or injury but,
lather reflected emironmental contingencies l7This
development led to the introduction of powerful clinical interventions, but it had the unfortunate effect of
increasing skepticism about the validity of the suffering in those with persistent pam
The considerable role of cognitive factors and coping
skills m augmenting and mitigating the suffering and
dysfunction of chronic pam has been compelhngly
demonstrated These insights have provided the
foundation of efficacious treatments 18

Pam is an essential determinant of the incapacitation
of many individuals who undergo impairment evaluation As observed by the Institute of Medicine
Committee on Pam and Disability and Chronic
Illness Behavior ,4 k The notion that all impairments
should be verifiable by objective evidence is administratively necessary for an entitlement program Yet
this notion is fundament* ly at odds with a realistic
understanding of how disease and injury operate to
incapacitate people Except for a very few conditions such as the loss of a limb, blindness deafness,
paralysis, or coma, most diseases and injuries do not
prevent people from working by mechanical failure
Rather, people are incapacitated by a variety of
unbearable sensations when they try to work '

Associated with these developments has been the
introduction of the term chionic pain s\ndrome (CPS)
into common parlance Although not official nomenclature, it is frequently used to describe an individual
who is markedly impaired by chronic pam with substantial psychological overlay l9 CPS is largely a
behavioral syndrome that affects a minority of those
with chronic pam It may best be understood as a form
of abnormal illness behavior that consists mainly of
excessive adoption of the sick role The term is useful
in that it properly directs therapy toward the reversal
of regression and away from an exclusive focus on
elimination of nociception It does not, however, substitute for a careful diagnosis of the physiologic, psychological and conditioning components that
comprise the syndrome The term CPS must be used
with caution, as groupmg pam problems together
under a generic disoider may mask and leave
untreated important physiologic differences

When pain persists, it has the capacity to dominate a
person's existence, contributing to significant impairment reduction in the quality of life functional limitations, and disability The ra\ages of chronic pam
often extend beyond the person who has it, as the
lives of family membeis are often dominated by the
pain of a loved one Indeed the children of individuals with chrome pam are at risk for suffering a simi
lar fate ' In addition to the human costs chronic pam
is extremely costly to society Medical expenditures
for pain-related assessment and treatment, indemnity
costs loss of productivity and loss of tax revenues
are estimated to be $125 billion each year in the
United States 16

A second major current has derived from explosive
growth in our understanding of the pathophysiology of
pam, winch has rendered many older concepts untenable Processes of peripheral and central sensitization
have been clarified, along with such phenomena as the
development of adienergic sensitivity in injured noci
ceptive fibers and the accumulation of ion channels at
sites of nerve injury, all of which may produce severe
pam in response to trivial stimulation Processes have
been identified by which umlateial inflammation,
trauma, or illness can lead to pam and sensitivity in
umnvolved, often contralateral, structures Physiologic

Neurophysiologic

processes underlying such symptoms, which were
often dismissed as "not real," have been found at the
level of the dorsal horn, thalamus, and sensory cortex.
Intense stimulation and peripheral nerve damage have
been found to induce persistent changes in the spinal
cord that, over time, alter the receptive field mapping
and the phenotype of neurons rostral to them, which in
turn may induce changes at the cortical level. These
findings are of major import. They demonstrate that
pain need not be symptomatic of a disease or injury
but, in fact, can become a disease unto itself.
A major implication of recent research on sensitization is that the failure of medical and surgical investigation to account for a given pain may result not
from looking in the wrong place, but from looking at
the wrong time. That is, the investigations may be
directed toward the organ or body part that was historically responsible for the individual's pain, but
they may be unrevealing because the pain, having
been initiated by an injury or illness in the past, is
now relatively independent.
Although sensitization of the peripheral and central
nervous system has been demonstrated repeatedly in
basic neuroscience research, there are currently no
widely accepted methods for determining whether
the symptoms of an individual with chronic pain can
be ascribed to sensitization. Thus, while the concept
of sensitization is extremely important to a conceptual understanding of chronic pain, there is currently
no systematic way to incorporate it into impairment
ratings.

Implications
The scientific advances described above have important implications for the assessment of pain-related
impairment. The AMA Guides as a whole embodies
the premise that injuries and illnesses cause deficits
in the functioning of organs or body parts, and these
deficits can be quantitatively assessed during an
impairment evaluation. In the simplest situations, an
individual experiences a definite biological insult
that creates a clear-cut abnormality in his or her biological functioning. This abnormality, in turn, leads
directly to deficits in activities of daily living (ADL)
that can be quantified during the course of an impairment evaluation. An example is an individual who
sustains a below-elbow amputation in a sawmill
accident.

The behavioral concept of CPS and the neurophysiology concept of peripheral or central nervous system
sensitization imply that pain and pain-related activity
restrictions may be dissociated from the biological
insult to which a person was exposed and from any
measurable biological dysfunction in that person's
organs or body parts. Both concepts thus challenge
the assumed linkages among biological insult, organ
or body part dysfunction, and ADL deficits that are
fundamental to the AMA rating system.
Physicians differ sharply in the way in which they
conceptualize the relations among biological insult,
measurable organ or body part dysfunction, and selfreported activity limitations in individuals with
chronic pain. Some physicians have a low threshold
for using diagnoses like "chronic pain syndrome" or
"psychogenic pain" to describe these people. The
diagnoses highlight the lack of association between
the complaints of the individuals and any welldefined biological abnormality.
Other physicians attempt to link the complaints of
pain patients to a biological abnormality. In general,
they do this by employing one of two strategies. The
first is to view the person as having an atypical presentation of a well-accepted syndrome. For example,
thoracic outlet syndrome is a well-recognized condition that can be caused by measurable abnormalities
in arterial, venous, or neural structures in the thoracic
outlet. Some physicians view people with chronic
pain and paresthesias in an upper extremity as having
a variant of thoracic outlet syndrome, even though
vascular studies and electrodiagnostic studies are
either normal or equivocal.20 The other strategy is to
construct diagnoses based on the person's symptoms
and on subjective physical examination findings. The
assumption of physicians employing this strategy is
that a biological undeipinning for the symptoms
exists, but that medical science has not yet identified
it. For example, the diagnosis of fibromyalgia is
based on individuals' reports of widespread pain and
their reports of tenderness during physical examination. Despite extensive research, no specific underlying biological abnormality has been discovered to
explain the reports of these people.

Acrimonious debates have occurred between physicians who favor biological explanations for controversial pain syndromes and those who construe the
syndromes as dissociated from any definable biological abnormality. The interpretation has significant
practical implications because many of the administrative agencies that provide benefits for people
with impairments emphasize the importance of
(1) objective findings of biological dysfunction and
(2) a clear causal link between an index injury and
an individual's present symptoms and findings.
If a painful condition is construed as a CPS or a
psychogenic pain syndrome, both of these criteria
are violated.
The distinction between well-accepted conditions
and those that are ambiguous or controversial is
itself ambiguous. Sometimes disagreements arise
about individuals with atypical presentations of
well-recognized painful syndromes. The example of
thoracic outlet syndrome was given above. Another
example is a person with chronic low back pain,
vague symptoms in one lower extremity, and an MRI
with questionable compromise of a lumbar nerve
root. The person might be described as having an
atypical presentation of a lumbar radiculopathy; an
alternative assessment is that the individual has a
nonspecific chronic pain syndrome involving the low
back. In other instances, disagreements center
around the validity of the diagnostic procedures used
to diagnose conditions. For example, a practitioner
of manual medicine might ascribe an individual's
back pain to a lumbar sublux? ^ion or torsion of the
ilium, whereas physicians not practiced in manual
medicine might discount these diagnoses because
they do not accept the validity of the physical examination maneuvers underlying them. Finally, as in the
case of fibromyalgia, reliable diagnostic criteria
exist but physicians disagree about whether the
condition diagnosed by use of these criteria has a
specific, definable biologic basis.
The controversies described above cannot be
resolved in this chapter of the Guides for the simple
reason that the medical community has not achieved
consensus about how to construe such conditions as
myofascial pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, and "disputed neurogenic" thoracic outlet syndrome.20 A
practical approach for performing impairment ratings
on individuals with ambiguous or controversial syndromes is given below.

18.3 Integrating PainRelated
Impairment Into
the Conventional
Impairment Rating
System
There are several difficulties associated with integrating pain-related impairment into an impairment
rating system such as the Guides. A basic challenge
for a system of rating pain-related impairment is to
incorporate the subjectivity associated with pain into
an impairment rating system whose fundamental
premise is that impairment assessment should be
based on objective findings. The inherent subjectivity
of pain is incongruent with the Guides' attempts to
assess impairment on the basis of objective measures
of organ dysfunction, as ; t requires that determinations of pain intensity and the restrictions imposed
by it must be largely based on patients' reports.
A second issue is that an individual's pain behaviors
are influenced by his or her social environment.
Impairment ratings are usually performed not to
establish academic facts or to make treatment decisions but, rather, to establish the financial obligations
of payers to individuals or, conversely, the entitlements of individuals to monetary rewards. Thus, the
social context surrounding impairment ratings might
provide an incentive for individuals to exaggerate
their reports of pain so as to maximize awards.
Conversely, since insurance companies and government agencies often hire the professionals who perform impairment ratings, evaluators may have an
incentive to doubt the complaints of individuals. An
ideal rating system would validate the genuine suffering of individuals and resist influence by those
who exaggerate their incapacitation for secondary
gain. In the absence of objective criteria for assessing
the severity and functional significance of pain, it has
proved exceedingly difficult to achieve this goal.

Third, this chapter assesses pain qualitatively. Because
percentages for pain-related impairment have not been
used and tested on a widespread basis, as have other
impairment ratings used in the Guides, it was decided
that impairment ratings for pain disorders would not
be expressed as percentages of whole person impairment. Future scientific evidence may emerge that will
enable a more quantifiable approach to be adopted.
Nevertheless, the value of a qualitative assessment is
that any identification of a significant pain component warrants additional consideration when interpreting impairment ratings used for allocation of
medical resources, work placement, or financial
compensation.
Finally, at a practical level, a chapter of the Guides
devoted to pain-related impairment should not be
redundant of or inconsistent with principles of
impairment rating described in other chapters. The
Guides' impairment ratings currently include
allowances for the pain that individuals typically
experience when they suffer from various injuries or
diseases, as articulated in Chapter 1 of the Guides:
^Physicians recognize the local and distant pain that
commonly accompanies many disorders. Impairment
ratings in the Guides already have accounted for
pain. For example, when a cervical spine disorder
produces radiating pain down the arm, the arm pain,
which is commonly seen, has been accounted for in
the cervical spine impairment rating" (p. 10). Thus,
if an examining physician determines that an individual has pain-related impairment, he or she will have
the additional task of decic .ng whether or not that
impairment has already been adequately incorporated into the rating the person has received on the
basis of other chapters of the Guides.

18.3a When This Chapter Should Be Used
to Evaluate Pain-Related Impairment
Organ and body system ratings of impairment should
be used whenever they adequately capture the actual
ADL deficits that individuals experience. However,
the organ and body system impairment rating does
not adequately address impairment in several situations, discussed below.

W h e n There Is Excess Pain in t h e Context of
Verifiable Medical Conditions That Cause Pain
Individuals in this group have pain associated with
medical conditions that are verifiable by objective
means. An example is an individual with a persistent
lumbar radiculopathy following a lumbar diskectomy. Such an individual will usually have objective
findings, including atrophy of the affected leg, muscle weakness, and MRI evidence of epidural scarring. An individual with these findings would receive
an impairment rating of 10% on the basis of the DRE
spine impairment rating system described in Chapter
15. Although the DRE rating is usually appropriate,
some individuals with persistent lumbar radiculopathies report "excess'' pain. That is, they report
that their pain causes severe ADL deficits, suggesting a level of impairment greater than 10%.
Procedures in this chapter can be used to assess this
additional impairment and to classify it as mild,
moderate, moderately severe, or severe.

When There Are Well-Established Pain
Syndromes Without Significant, Identifiable
Organ Dysfunction to Explain the Pain
Individuals in this group have pain syndromes that
are widely accepted by physicians based on the
individuals' clinical presentation but that are not associated with definable tissue pathology. These syndromes are not ratable under the conventional rating
system and also they do not fit any of the other chapters in the Guides since there is no measurable organ
dysfunction. Individuals with these well-established
pain syndromes can be evaluated on the basis of concepts elaborated in this chapter. These individuals
must have symptoms and signs that can plausibly be
attributed to a well-defined medical condition. Some
of the most common of these syndromes are listed in
Table 18-1. The list is not comprehensive and may
change as the body of medical information about
various pain syndromes grows. If an examiner determines that an individual has a diagnosis that is not
on the list, he or she may rate the individual's painrelated impairment if he or she is convinced that the
diagnosed condition is well recognized and that the
pain-related impairment is a consequence of the condition. An explanation should be provided in writing.

Table 18-1 Illustrative List of Weil-Established Pain
Syndromes Without Significant, Identifiable
Organ Dysfunction to Explain the Pain

Table 18-2 Illustrative List of Associated Pain
Syndromes
Postparaplegic pain

Headache (most)

Syringomyelia pain

Postherpetic neuralgia

Thalamic syndrome

Tic douloureux

Brachial plexus avulsion pain

Erythromelalgia

Nerve entrapment syndromes

Complex regional pain syndrome, type 1 (reflex
sympathetic dystrophy)

Peripheral neuropathy
I Complex regional pain syndrome, type 2 (causalgia)

I Any injury to the nervous system

When There Are Other Associated Pain
Syndromes
Use this chapter to evaluate pain-related impairment
when dealing with syndromes with the following
characteristics: (a) They are associated with identifiable organ dysfunction that is ratable according to
other chapters in the Guides; (b) they may be associated with well-established pain syndromes, but the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of the pain syndromes
is not predictable; so that (c) the impairment ratings
provided in other chapters of the Guides do not capture the added burden of illness borne by individuals
who have the associated pain syndromes.
Examples of syndromes in this category are given in
Table 18-2. Again, the list is not comprehensive, so
an examiner must use his or her judgment to decide
whether an individual with a > unlisted condition
should be placed in this category.

18.3b When This Chapter Should Not Be
Used to Rate Pain-Related Impairment
When Conditions Are Adequately Rated in
Other Chapters of the Guides
Examiners should not use this chapter to rate painrelated impairment for any condition that can be adequately rated on the basis of the body and organ
impairment rating systems given in other chapters of
the Guides.

When Rating Individuals With Low
Credibility
Since the assessment of pain-related impairment
depends heavily on the verbal reports of individuals,
examiners must be careful to provide ratings only for
those who provide information that appears to be
reasonable and accurate. The reports of individuals
may lack credibility for a variety of reasons. Some
people appear unable or unwilling to provide information that is sufficiently detailed for an examiner to
assess pain-related impairment. The reasons for this
are multiple, including psychosis, severe depression,
memory deficits secondary to brain injury, and a lack
of cooperation. Other individuals provide detailed
information, but the validity of the information is
questionable.

When There Are Ambiguous or
Controversial Pain Syndromes
As noted above, physicians disagree sharply about
whether individuals with chronic pain should be construed as having conditions with definite, albeit
obscure, biologic underpinnings. The alternative is to
describe these people as having CPS, psychogenic
pain syndromes, or some other term implying that
their pain cannot be associated with a well-accepted
biologic abnormality. For purposes of this chapter,
the pain of individuals with ambiguous or controversial pain syndromes is considered unratable.

As noted earlier, the distinctions between wellrecognized conditions and ambiguous or controversial ones is subtle, so that no definitive list of
ambiguous or controversial conditions can be given.
The examining physician can. however, identify
ambiguous or controversial syndromes by asking
the following questions:
1. Do the individual's symptoms and/or physical
findings match any known medical condition?
2. Is the individual's presentation typical of the diagnosed condition?
3. Is the diagnosed condition one that is widely
accepted by physicians as having a well-defined
pathophysiologic basis?
If the answer to all three of the above questions is
yes, the examiner should consider the individual's
pain-related impairment to be ratable and should proceed according to the rating protocol described in
Section 18.3d. If the answer to any of the above three
questions is no, the examiner should consider the
individual's pam-related impairment to be unratable
on the basis of concepts in this chapter. In that
instance, he or she should still use the assessment
protocol described in Section 18.3d to determine the
severity and impact of the individual's pain and
report the results. That is, even if the examiner considers the person to have unratable pain, he or she
needs to characterize the apparent pain-related
impairment.
The fact that pain-related impairment may be unratable either on the basis of the organ and body rating
system or on the basis of this chapter highlights the
limits that exist in the science and practice of impairment evaluation. The judgment that pain-related
impairment is unratable does not mean that the evaluating physician considers the pain to be "unreal" or
fabricated. In fact, individuals with ambiguous or
controversial pain syndromes may suffer from severe
pain and report significant restrictions in ADL. These
reports are often corroborated by information provided by family members and treating physicians.
Thus, when a physician judges pain-related impairment to be unratable, he or she is simply asserting an
inability to determine how the activity restrictions
reported by an individual are linked to a disease or
injury. The decision regarding how to construe these
reports must therefore be administrative, not medical.

Advances in diagnostic technology and clinical experience may eventually make pain-related impairment
rating feasible for individuals with ambiguous or
controversial pain syndromes. Al the present time,
however, the best option available to an examiner is
to report that the individual has apparent impairment
that is unratable on the basis of current medical
knowledge. Insurance companies and administrative
agencies that dispense benefits for impairments will
need to make the final decision about how to use this
information.

18.3c Administrative Issues Associated
With Pain-Related Impairment
In essence, this chapter divides apparent impairment
into three categories: (1) impairment ratable on the
basis of the conventional rating system used throughout Guides Chapters 3 through 17; (2) pain-related
impairment ratable according to concepts outlined in
this chapter; and (3) p;, n-related impairment that is
unratable according to the concepts outlined in this
chapter.
There are two major reasons why these distinctions
are crucial. First, agencies that provide benefits for
individuals with impairments function under different legal mandates with respect to pain-related
impairment. For example, workers' compensation
laws in some states mandate that pain-related impairment be considered in disability awards for injured
workers.21 In other states pain-related impairment is
not considered.22
The system described here distinguishes between an
impairment rating using the organ system approach
and impairment awarded on the basis of pain. This
distinction permits administrative agencies to count
''conventional" impairment ratings and pain-related
impairment ratings on an equal footing, to discount
pain-related impairment ratings, or to disregard them
entirely. Similarly, the present system identifies individuals with unratable pain-related impairment so
that administrative agencies can make informed decisions about whether or not to compensate these
individuals.

Second, the distinction between ratable and unratable
pain-related impairment embodies a key premise of
this chapter physicians do not currently possess reliable valid techniques for assessing impairment associated with pain in all clinical settings It is then
more appropriate for the examining physician to
descnbe the individual's pain-related impairment as
unratable than to give a rating that cannot be supported by either scientific evidence or consensus

C It the individual appears to have pain-related
impairment that has increased the burden of his or
her condition slightly, the examiner may increase
the percentage found in A by up to 3%
D The examiner should perform a formal painrelated impairment assessment if any of the following conditions are met
1) The individual appears to have pain-related
impairment that is substantially in excess of
the impairment determined in step A

18.3d How to Rate Pain-Related
Impairment: Overview

2) The individual has a well-recognized medical
condition that is characterized by pam in the
absence of measurable dysfunction of an organ
or body part (see Table 18-1 for examples)
or
3) The individual has a syndrome with the following characteristics (a) it is associated with
identifiable organ dysfunction that is ratable
according to other chapters in the Guides, (b) it
may be associated with a well-established pam
syndrome, but L,e occurrence or nonoccurrence of the pam syndrome is not predictable,
so that (c) the impairment ratings provided in
step A do not capture the added burden of illness borne by the individual because of his or
her associated pain syndrome (see Table 18-2
for examples)
E If the examiner performs a formal pain-related
impairment rating, he or she may increase the percentage found m step A by up to 3%, and he or
she should classify the individual's pain-related
impairment into one of foui categories mild,
moderate, moderately severe, or severe In addition, the examiner should determine whether the
pain-related impairment is latable or wvatable
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The system described in this chapter relies largely on
self-reports by individuals Thus, it differs significantly from the conventional rating system, which
relies primarily on objective indices of organ dysfunction or failure The present system assesses pain
intensity, emotional distress related to pain and ADL
deficits secondary to pain ADL deficits are given the
greatest weight An individual's pain-related impairment is considered unratable if (a) his or her behavior during the evaluation raises significant issues of
credibility, (b) he or she has clinical findings atypical
of a well-accepted medical condition, or (c) he or
she is diagnosed with a condition that is vague or
controversial
A detailed protocol for assessing pain-related impairment is descnbed below and outlined in Figure 18-1
A Evaluate the individual according to the body or
organ rating system an 1 determine an impairment
percentage During the evaluation, the examiner
should informally assess pain-related impairment
B If the body system impairment rating appears to
adequately encompass the pain experienced by
the individual due to his or her medical condition,
his or her impairment rating is as indicated by the
body system impairment rating

